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Abstract
Background: The unregulated availability and irrational use of tuberculosis (TB) medicines is a major issue of public 
health concern globally. Governments of many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) have committed to 
regulating the quality and availability of TB medicines, but with variable success. Regulation of TB medicines remains 
an intractable challenge in many settings, but the reasons for this are poorly understood. The objective of this paper is 
to elaborate processes of regulation of quality and availability of TB medicines in three LMICs – India, Tanzania, and 
Zambia – and to understand the factors that constrain and enable these processes. 
Methods: We adopted the action-centred approach of policy implementation analysis that draws on the experiences 
of relevant policy and health system actors in order to understand regulatory processes. We drew on data from three 
case studies commissioned by the World Health Organization (WHO), on the regulation of TB medicines in India, 
Tanzania, and Zambia. Qualitative research methods were used, including in-depth interviews with 89 policy and 
health system actors and document review. Data were organized thematically into accounts of regulators’ authority 
and capacity; extent of policy implementation; and efficiency, transparency, and accountability. 
Results: In India, findings included the absence of a comprehensive policy framework for regulation of TB medicines, 
constraints of authority and capacity of regulators, and poor implementation of prescribing and dispensing norms in 
the majority private sector. Tanzania had a policy that restricted import, prescribing and dispensing of TB medicines 
to government operators. Zambia procured and dispensed TB medicines mainly through government services, 
albeit in the absence of a single policy for restriction of medicines. Three cross-cutting factors emerged as crucially 
influencing regulatory processes - political and stakeholder support for regulation, technical and human resource 
capacity of regulatory bodies, and the manner of private actors’ influence on regulatory policy and implementation. 
Conclusion: Strengthening regulation to ensure the quality and availability of TB medicines in LMIC with emerging 
private markets may necessitate financial and technical inputs to upgrade regulatory bodies, as well as broader 
political and ethical actions to reorient and transform their current roles.
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Implications for policy makers
• The following critical factors around regulation of tuberculosis (TB) medicines require attention in the three study countries, Tanzania, Zambia, 
and India, with lessons for other low- and middle-countries (LMICs): inadequate political support for regulatory functions, poor technical and 
human resource capacity of regulatory bodies, and private actors’ influence on regulatory policy and implementation. 
• Strengthening regulation to ensure the quality and availability of TB medicines in LMICs with emerging private markets may necessitate 
financial and technical inputs to upgrade regulatory bodies, and also political actions to reorient and strengthen their roles.
Implications for the public
The quality and availability of tuberculosis (TB) medicines are consequences of regulatory processes that are political, sometimes influenced by 
private interests, and often hidden from public eye. It is important that people demand that regulatory processes should be accountable, transparent, 
and in the public interest, and that we respect the roles of people working in regulatory organizations since they play an important function in society.
Key Messages 
Introduction
The unregulated availability and irrational use of tuberculosis 
(TB) medicines is a major issue of public health concern 
globally. Governments of many low- and middle-income 
countries (LMICs) have committed to regulating the 
quality and availability of TB medicines, but with variable 
success. Regulation of TB medicines remains an intractable 
challenge in many settings, but the reasons for this are 
poorly understood. The objective of this paper is to elaborate 
processes of regulation of quality and availability of TB 
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medicines in three LMICs – India, Tanzania, and Zambia – 
and to understand the factors that influence and constrain 
these processes. 
Regulation of essential medicines is a critical function of the 
state. It encompasses a range of legal, administrative, and 
technical interventions in the activities of the pharmaceutical 
sector, undertaken with the aims of ensuring drug safety, 
efficacy and quality in the interests of public health1 (see 
Figure 1). The regulation of the quality and availability 
of antimicrobials such as TB medicines is of particular 
importance in the developing world, given the persistence 
of high burden of TB in many countries, and the emergence 
of drug resistance fuelled by widespread inappropriate 
prescribing and dispensing practices. 
Governments across the world adopt measures to regulate 
the quality and availability of medicines – these measures 
are enacted through networks of regulatory organizations, 
typically consisting of a central authority and regional or 
provincial branches. The authority and capacity of regulatory 
organizations to enact policies, and the actual implementation 
of those policies are essential for the effectiveness of 
regulatory policies ie, their ability to produce desired 
outcomes of high drug quality, availability in response to need, 
and appropriate utilization. In addition to being effective, 
regulatory policies must also be efficient, transparent and 
accountable. 
Regulation of quality and availability of TB medicines 
involves multiple functions, including licencing individuals 
and premises, inspecting manufacturers and distributors, 
assessing products and monitoring drug quality. Figure 2 
sequentially maps the different processes involved in making 
TB medicines available to users, and the different actors 
involved. According to this sequence, the availability of TB 
medicines can be seen as a composite of three processes: (1) 
production and procurement – either by importation, or from 
domestic manufacturers, (2) storage and distribution, and (3) 
prescribing and dispensing. The map pinpoints the levels at 
which regulatory actions are usually applied, and the actors 
operating at these different levels, and was hence useful in 
guiding the selection of respondents and in writing up the 
research.
Different LMICs have had differing experiences of regulating 
TB medicines, yet there is little literature on national and 
subnational processes of regulation. In some instances 
national bodies regulating drug quality have been reported 
to be barely functional,2 while further down the chain, 
public sector procurers often struggle with stock control and 
inventory management.3-5 Poor treatment practices and the 
high prevalence of over-the-counter (OTC) dispensing of 
TB medicines have been explained by the absence of laws in 
this area and, where they do exist, by inadequate government 
capacities for enforcement of regulatory norms.6,7 The 
literature insufficiently examines the factors that underlie 
these widespread failures of regulatory institutions, and 
their variable effectiveness in different settings – this paper 
addresses this gap in the literature. 
The framework of regulation used in this study (Figure 1) 
is adapted from the World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) 
landmark reports on effective drug regulation from 1999 and 
2002.1,8 The framework outlines (1) the different activities 
(production and procurement, stocking and distribution, 
dispensing and prescribing) that are targets of regulation of 
TB medicines, and (2) the essential elements of regulation 
(organizational authority and capacity; implementation; 
efficient and accountable processes) that are necessary for the 
achievement of relevant outcomes related to drug quality and 
availablilty.
Methods
We follow an “action-centred” approach to investigating 
regulatory policy and implementation, in which regulatory 
processes can be seen as involving interactions between 
groups of actors within social and organizational contexts, 
and at different levels of policy and implementation.9 This 
approach seeks to understand regulatory processes through 
the lens of the experiences and perspectives of these policy 
and health system actors, which is achieved by conducting 
qualitative research to access these experiences.10,11
We drew on data from case studies on the regulation of TB 
medicines in India, Tanzania, and Zambia commissioned 
by the WHO, and conducted by a team of researchers led 
by the lead author in the period from 2009-2011.12,13 These 
Regulatory "targets" 
- Production and 
procurement
- Stocking and 
distribution
- Dispensing and 
prescribing
AUTHORITY AND CAPACITY
- Scope of regulatory authority 
- Structure of regulatory 
organizations 
- Human resources 
- Financing 
- Standards and procedures 
IMPLEMENTATION
- Type, extent of actual activities 
- Planning, monitoring and 
evaluation 
- Strategies to overcome 
constraints
EFFICIENCY, TRANSPARENCY, 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
- Effectiveness and efficiency
- Political, commercial influences
- Degree of transparency
- Communication with clients, 
consumers 
- Accountability for results
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- High quality pharmaceutical 
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Figure 1. Framework for Regulation of Quality and Availability of Tuberculosis (TB) Medicines (Adapted From Ratanawijitrasin and 
Wondemagegnehu1).
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country cases were selected purposefully as having variable 
contexts, with a view to gaining a wide range of observations 
and insights. The criteria for selection included (1) reported 
availability of TB drugs in private pharmacies (India: high; 
Tanzania and Zambia: low); (2) the size of the local private 
manufacturing and retail sectors for medicines (India: large; 
Tanzania and Zambia: smaller); and (3) geographical setting, 
ie, Asia and Africa. 
For each case study, investigators conducted in-depth 
interviews14 with representatives of regulatory organizations 
and departments engaged in regulating the availability and 
quality of TB medicines, and with actors affected by these 
processes (Figure 2). A breakdown of study participants by 
country is presented in Table 1. Lists of study participants to be 
interviewed were drawn up purposefully, based on discussions 
with WHO country offices, National TB Programme (NTP) 
representatives and other key informants, with attention to 
ensuring maximum variability in the types of groups, and 
levels of administrative categories represented.15
Geographically, the participants were identified from within 
and around the capitals of the respective countries and/
or capitals of provinces or states, since typically regulatory 
institutions were located in these areas. In the case of India, 
due to the large size of  the country, the research was conducted 
in the national capital Delhi, and also in two states selected 
on the basis of varying performance, in terms of standardized 
health indicators – Kerala (high performing) and Rajasthan 
(low performing). The interviews were supported and 
triangulated by review of relevant policy documentation.11 
Numbers of participants, and an indicative list of types of 
participants interviewed and policy documents reviewed in 
each country is presented in Table 2.
The research team conducted structured interviews with study 
participants with the help of topic guides (see topic listings in 
Table 3), and written notes were taken during the interviews. 
Due to the diversity of institutional functions and roles, and 
different countries represented, the topic guides were adapted 
according to the respondent’s specialised area of knowledge. 
Data from respondents’ accounts and documentary sources 
were organized manually using word-processing software, 
and thematically analyzed using the “framework” approach 
of qualitative data analysis for applied policy research.16 Data 
were organized according to a thematic framework combining 
a priori themes reflecting the regulatory activities and 
processes outlined in Figure 1, as well as new and emergent 
themes arising from respondents accounts. The organized 
data were charted and data corresponding to different themes 
was extracted and written up as distinct case study reports. 
Cross-case themes were also identified, as part of the third, 
analytic stage of the framework approach. A priori, emergent 
and analytical themes were applied to the data and written up 
in the form of this paper.
Informed consent was obtained prior to conducting the 
interviews. All data were stored in encrypted format with 
restricted access, and care has been taken to ensure anonymity 
of all individuals cited in all research reports, including this 
article.
Results
In this section, we present findings from the three country 
case studies, respectively, around policy and health system 
actors’ experiences of processes of regulation of quality 
and availability of TB medicines. Within each country case 
study, findings are organized according to key elements of 
Multinational 
Pharmaceutical 
Companies
Public Procurers 
and  Distributors
Private Importers 
and Distributors
Domestic 
Manufacturers
Public Hospitals 
and Facilities
Govt-affiliated 
Private Facilities
Private Pharmacies 
and Hospitals 
(Unaffiliated)
Informal/Illegal 
Private Facilities
Patients 
Production
and
Procurement
Stocking and 
Distribution
Prescribing 
and
Dispensing
Donors 
Figure 2. Targets of Regulatory Activities: Actors and Steps Involved in Making Tuberculosis (TB) Medicines Available.
Table 1. Number of Interviews Conducted by Country (n = 89)
Country Number of Implementers/Regulators Interviewed Number of Private Stakeholders/Actors Interviewed
Tanzania 14 9
Zambia 10 11
India (Delhi, Kerala, Rajasthan) 29 16
Total 53 36
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the framework of regulation of quality and availability of 
TB medicines (Figure 1) - namely regulatory authority and 
capacity; implementation; and efficiency, transparency, and 
accountability. 
India 
Background
The Revised National Tuberculosis Control Programme 
(RNTCP) under the auspices of the Ministry of Health and 
Family Welfare (MoHFW) of the Government of India had 
the mandate of prevention and care of  TB in the country, 
including dispensing of medicines through the existing 
network of government health services. This network included 
facilities at state, district- and primary-levels, providing 
TB medicines free of cost. The Central TB Division of the 
MoHFW is the federal authority responsible for administering 
the RNTCP at the Centre. The RNTCP officially promulgated 
the policy of directly observed therapy short-course (DOTS), 
the WHO-recommended global strategy for TB control, in all 
government facilities and in affiliated private facilities. First-
line TB medicines for use in government health facilities that 
implemented the RNTCP were procured centrally (at national-
level). In the states of Rajasthan and Kerala, the RNTCP was 
operationalized through the State TB Office which is under 
the jurisdiction of the state Director of Health Services. The 
State TB Officer was assisted by a Chief Medical Officer as 
well as District TB officers. In both states, free short-course 
chemotherapy under the DOTS approach was made available 
through the government’s network of health facilities.
India’s private pharmaceutical manufacturing sector is one of 
the largest in the world, valued at $6.0 billion, with more than 
300 companies. The presence of an informal or illegal sector 
for manufacture and import of medicines in India is generally 
acknowledged, although details of volumes are not well-
known. At the time of the study, in the anti-TB drug market, 
there were 8 major pharmaceutical companies producing 
single drugs as well as fixed-dose combinations.17 There were 
roughly 65 000 distributors and 550 000 retail pharmacies in 
India in 2008.18 More than 800 000 qualified allopathic doctors 
work in India in diverse private clinical establishments. 
Irrational prescriptions of TB drugs in the private sector 
(including single-drug therapy, inappropriate drugs, and 
length of regimens), and frequent OTC dispensation of TB 
medicines have been observed by various researchers.19-22 
Rajasthan and Kerala, like most other states have numerous 
private pharmaceutical distributors, wholesalers and retailers, 
who are either independent, or part of a growing sector of 
large pharmaceutical franchises. These providers variously 
obtained their stocks from manufacturers located either in 
Rajasthan or in other States. No information was available 
Table 2. Study Participants and Policy Documents Reviewed
Implementers/Regulators Private Stakeholders/Actors Key Policy Documents
•	 NTP officials and personnel
•	 Health Ministry officials
•	 Drug regulatory authorities (national and provincial)
•	 WHO country offices
•	 Administrators of provincial TB programmes, 
facilities
•	 Departments/agencies responsible for 
pharmaceutical procurement, stocking and 
dispensing 
•	 Professional regulatory bodies (national and 
provincial)
•	 Central laboratories and government production 
units
•	 Private hospital administrators
•	 Private practitioners 
•	 NGOs partnering with NTP
•	 Medical associations
•	 Private pharmaceutical manufaturers and 
importers
•	 Private pharmaceutical distributors and 
wholesalers
•	 Private pharmacists 
•	 Government pharmacists and health 
workers
•	 Professional associations and trade unions
•	 Government TB programme 
manuals, schemes and reports
•	 Relevant laws and acts of the state
•	 National health policy and plan 
statements
•	 Websites of relevant programmes 
and authorities 
•	 Relevant expert and committee 
reports on drug quality and rational 
use
Abbreviations: WHO, World Health Organization; TB, tuberculosis; NTP, National TB Programme; NGOs, non-governmental organizations.
Table 3. List of Interview Topicsa 
Implementers/Regulators Private Stakeholders/Actors
1.	 Views on the problem of inappropriate use of TB medicines
1.	 Role of firm/organization in production/distribution/provision of TB 
medicines
2.	 Policy or institutional stance on the problem 2.	 Experiences of participating in these activities
3.	 Formal regulatory functions of institution 3.	 Provisions for quality control in areas of work
4.	 Actual role of the institution vis-a-vis regulation of TB medicines – in detail 4.	 Organizational stance vis-a-vis regulation of relevant activities 
5.	 Experiences of actual institutional processes relating to regulation of TB 
medicines 
5.	 Views on the need for greater regulation of relevant activities
6.	 Experiences of actual institutional processes relating to partnership with 
private providers, where relevant
6.	 Experiences of encountering regulatory processes if any – in detail
7.	  Role conflicts and overlaps with other institutions, if any
7.	 Experience of partnership with government TB programme (if 
relevant)
8.	 Obstacles and concerns vis-a-vis the issue of regulation of TB medicines 
8.	 Key obstacles and concerns vis-a-vis the issue of regulation of TB 
medicines 
9.	 Opportunities for partnership with private sector, and for strengthening 
regulatory processes
9.	 Key opportunities for partnerships and for quality enhancement
10.	 Avenues for institutional development and areas of improvement or new 
work
10.	 Organizational ambitions and plans for future work
Abbreviation: TB, tuberculosis.
a Full topic guides are available on request.
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on the presence of illicit manufacturers; however, there an 
informal sector of drug shops was reported in Rajasthan by 
key informants. 
Policy Framework for Regulation of Tuberculosis Medicines
India had no single policy for regulation of TB medicines 
at the time of undertaking this study, and different 
organizations and departments of state were responsible for 
the enforcement of various regulatory norms. In 2013, the 
Government of India identified 46 drugs, including first line 
anti-TB medicines, to be included under a new schedule (H1), 
which specifies that the drugs must be sold on a prescription 
by qualified medical practitioners and that the pharmacist 
must maintain a record of the drugs sold, details of the 
prescribing provider and the name of the patient. Information 
on the extent of enforcement of schedule H1 is not available) 
The Drug and Cosmetics Act defined the mandate of the 
Central Drugs Standard Control Organization (CDSCO) (the 
primary regulatory authority for medicines in India), and its 
subsidiary offices at state-level. At the same time, the RNTCP 
was administered centrally by the Central TB Division of 
the MoHFW and was responsible for implementing the 
DOTS strategy for TB control in all government facilities 
and affiliated private facilities (NTP, revised schemes for 
non-governmental organizations [NGOs] and private 
providers 2008). At the time of the study, all TB medicines 
in India were schedule H drugs, which indicates that they 
are meant to be provided only on prescription by qualified 
medical practitioners (Interviews NTP official, national-level 
drug control official; Drugs and Cosmetics Act and Rules 
1940, amendment 2005). Neither Rajasthan nor Kerala had 
a specific policy on regulation of TB medicines. State Drug 
Controllers’ offices were responsible for regulating the sale 
of all medicines, and the licensing of retail pharmacists and 
wholesalers.
Regulatory Authority and Capacity
The CDSCO was mandated to approve new drug formulations, 
following which manufacturing licenses were obtainable from 
state-level authorities. TB medicines for use in government 
and affiliated private facilities that implement the RNTCP 
were procured centrally (at national-evel). These were either 
purchased directly or with donor support, or procured by 
the global drug facility (GDF) of the Stop TB Partnership. At 
the time of the study, WHO prequalification (PQ) was not 
a uniform requirement for centralized procurement of TB 
medicines, in spite of initiatives on the part of some donors 
to promote mandatory PQ (Interviews, NTP official, WHO 
official). 
Respondents widely expressed concerns around the technical 
capacities of national- and state-level regulators. At the time 
of conducting the study, the CDSCO did not qualify as a 
“stringent regulatory authority” in accordance with global 
norms (Interviews, WHO official, NTP official, state-level drug 
control official, state-level TB control official). WHO officials 
also expressed concern over variable technical capabilities 
of different State Drug Controllers. There were also widely 
expressed concerns around the adequacy of human resource 
capacity of the national and state regulators (Interviews, 
national-level drug control official, WHO official). Given over 
10 000 pharmaceutical manufacturing units in the country, 
according to a national-level drug control official, regulatory 
organizations were well short of the prevailing norm of one 
inspector for every 50 manufacturing units. The CDSCO 
had reportedly taken steps to check counterfeiting of drugs 
by increasing the quantum of inspectors, and by instituting 
formal procedures for prosecution and punitive action against 
offenders. Amendments in the Drugs and Cosmetics Act to 
increase criminal penalties for manufacture of spurious drugs 
and manufacture without licences were also reported to be in 
progress (Interview, national-level drug control official).
RNTCP norms stipulated the evaluation of drug quality 
throughout the government drug supply chain, including 
batch testing prior to release of fresh medicines by 
manufacturers, and periodic inspection of drug samples at 
suppliers’ premises, drug depots and state and district drug 
stores (Interviews, NTP official, national-level drug control 
official). State Drug Control offices are mandated to license 
retail and wholesale stores and regulate the sale of drugs, 
including inspecting pharmacies for quality of dispensed 
drugs and adherence to prescription-drug norms (Interview, 
national-level drug control official).
Severe human resource shortages were cited as a key 
obstacle to effective regulation of the retail sector, preventing 
adherence to a key provision of the Drugs and Cosmetics 
Act that states that each retailer is required to be inspected 
at least once a year. A statement by a national-level drug 
control official reflected the mismatch of capacities and 
workload – “my 500 inspectors cannot regulate 500 000 
pharmacies (in the country).” According to officials of the 
drug control authorities and WHO, reforms were underway 
to boost the organization’s human resource strength. The 
role of the statutory State Pharmacy Council was largely 
restricted to registration of trained pharmacists and renewal 
of their licences, and does not assure the quality of day-to-
day dispensing practices (Interviews, state-level pharmacy 
council officials).
More than one respondent highlighted the absence of an 
official body tasked with ensuring the use of particular drug 
regimens by clinicians (Interviews, WHO official, NTP 
official, national-level drug control official). The regimens 
proposed by the RNTCP did not carry weight outside of 
government facilities, whereas the mandate of the drug 
regulators is restricted to the registration and approval 
of specific molecules, not of drug regimens. Statutory 
professional councils reported that there was no legal 
framework within which they could correct the prescribing 
practices of practitioners (Interviews, state-level medical, and 
pharmacy council officials).
Implementation
The effectiveness of regulation of production and import 
of medicines is poorly understood. Press reports had 
highlighted widespread availability of counterfeit drugs in 
Indian markets, however, according to informants, studies by 
the CDSCO and the Indian Medical Association had brought 
up significantly different figures (lower in the case of the 
CDSCO study) of the prevalence of counterfeit drugs in the 
open market (Interviews, national-level drug control officials, 
state-level medical association officials). Several respondents 
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reported that there were no actual instances of penalization 
of defaulting and illegal manufacturers (Interviews, national- 
and state-level NTP officials, state-level medical association 
officials).
Within the RNTCP, mechanisms to monitor distribution 
of medicines were widely reported to be stringent. District 
authorities are responsible for identifying deviations from 
standard practice and effecting corrections. Transportation 
of drugs was by independent contract, and security was 
supported by a system of consignment vouchers. Within 
government health facilities, it was universally reported that 
prescribing practices were largely in keeping with DOTS 
norms (Interviews, national- and state-level NTP officials, 
WHO official). 
Non-adherence to standard treatment regimens by private 
practitioners and OTC dispensing of  TB medicines was widely 
reported, including by NTP officials and representatives 
of pharmaceutical companies, to be commonplace and 
unchecked, confirming several independent research 
findings.21-23 The same respondents highlighted that 
scheduling norms are also widely violated, with prescription 
TB medicines available OTC widely and commonly. 
Reportedly, facility inspections were infrequent and 
prosecutions rarely took place – many retailers take advantage 
of this and disregard scheduling norms. 
Efficiency, Transparency, and Accountability
Regulation of prescribing and dispensing practices was 
marred by a minimal, sometimes conflicted engagement of 
professional bodies. Representatives of statutory state-level 
medical and pharmacy councils wholly rejected the possibility 
of a role for them in controlling deviant provider practices. No 
pharmacist had ever been struck off the pharmacists’ register 
for infringement of the Indian Pharmacy Act, said a member 
of a state pharmacy council. The council official appeared 
to renounce any role in regulation, observing that in spite 
of widespread infringements of laws by pharmacists, “we do 
not pressure them.” Instead, an educational and informative 
role of councils was emphasized by this respondent, by way 
of raising standards and improving practices. There was little 
by way of professional guidance for private practitioners on 
best TB treatment practices in line with the International 
Standards for Tuberculosis Care (ISTC), stated NTP 
officials. Further, medical associations also actively opposed 
standardized DOTS regimens on the stated grounds that 
greater discretion for prescribing practitioners, rather than 
greater standardization, is preferable for a disease with diverse 
manifestations (Interviews, state-level medical association 
officials). Professional councils also appeared isolated from 
regulatory processes, with most respondents from other 
regulatory agencies reporting no or little interaction with 
them (Interviews, national- and state-level drug control 
officials, NTP officials).
A drug control official narrated recent discussions with WHO 
officials about their inability to control OTC dispensing of TB 
medicines: the drug regulatory body is mainly focused on 
regulating products and equipment, said the respondent, and 
monitoring pharmacy practices was beyond their capabilities. 
This respondent also highlighted that drug controllers 
have no actual authority over medical practitioners or their 
prescribing practices, including the frequently reported 
practice of prescribing costlier branded medicines rather than 
cheaper generics. Drug controllers’ almost exclusive focus on 
ensuring the technical quality of medicines, coupled with the 
councils’ inaction, meant that the key agenda of regulating 
the practices of dealers and practitioners remains generally 
unaddressed. The prevalence of TB among rural and poor 
urban populations made it particularly difficult to regulate TB 
medicines, since flourishing, poorly regulated informal drug 
markets cater to these communities (Interviews, national-
level drug control official, WHO official). 
The division of responsibilities between Central and State 
authorities was widely reported to be a source of ambiguity 
and confusion. Rules for approving drug formulations 
were ambiguously applied, with some companies allegedly 
obtaining approval illegally from state authorities rather 
than central authorities (Interview, WHO official, national-
level drug control official). Several state TB officials were 
critical of the highly centralized nature of rule-setting around 
regulatory policies for medicines. A WHO official noted that 
the decentralization of authority to State drug controllers, 
with their lower technical capacities, presented a challenge for 
the maintenance of quality control standards. A drug control 
official suggested that the task of working with different states, 
each with their own policies and protocols, was chaotic, and 
that the implementation of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act was 
not uniform in different states. 
According to a drug control official, regulation of drug 
availability in India was a complex task involving managing 
sometimes tacit expectations of different stakeholders 
–“everyone comes with a motive, the motives are there, 
but they are seldom talked about.” Another drug regulator 
suggested that it was important to include voices of 
pharmaceutical manufacturers in the policy-making 
processes – representatives of manufacturing industry 
associations are frequently invited to meetings to deliberate 
policy issues. State TB programme officials cited the role of 
powerful political influences, and lobbying by pharmaceutical 
companies to prevent stricter scheduling policies for TB drug 
availability. A donor representative highlighted that ‘political’ 
considerations – the need to protect multiple stakeholder 
interests and voices – were more pronounced in the domain 
of pharmaceutical policy than in many other sectors. 
Tanzania
Background
The National Tuberculosis and Leprosy Programme (NTLP), 
an arm of the MoHFW, was officially charged with prevention 
and care of TB in the country, including dispensing medicines 
through their network of health facilities. This network 
included facilities at provincial-, district- and primary-levels, 
providing TB medicines free of cost.
Private medical practice in Tanzania was prohibited under 
socialist rule in 1977,24 and this law was repealed only in 
1991. There was an active private medical sector in urban 
areas in Tanzania, including a number of larger private for-
profit hospitals in the larger cities such as Dar es Salaam and 
Arusha. Little was known about the profile of the private for-
profit sector in rural areas, which is dominated by smaller 
medical establishments and drug shops. A review by Janovsky 
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and Travis indicated that in 2006, there were 900 independent 
private practices, 339 registered pharmacies, and around 4600 
licensed drug shops in the country. 
There was little by way of a pharmaceutical manufacturing 
sector in Tanzania, at the time of the study. All TB medicines 
in the country were imported by the government, and 
importation by private distributors was not permitted by 
law. Government procedure required that the Medical Stores 
Department (MSD) procure the drugs from WHO-accredited 
suppliers through international competitive tender. At the 
time of this study, the GDF of the Stop TB Partnership, hosted 
by WHO, was active in supporting the Tanzanian NTLP 
by directly procuring and supplying first-line fixed-dose 
combination TB medicines (Interviews, WHO and NTLP 
officials).
Estimates of requirements of TB medicines were made 
periodically by the NTLP and the MSD, and the medicines 
were procured. Consignments of medicines were sent to the 
provincial facilities and distributed to district and primary 
health facilities (Interviews, Medical Stores officials). At 
government health facilities and NTP-affiliated private 
clinics, all TB medicines under the DOTS regimen were 
required to be prescribed and dispensed free, in keeping with 
the guidelines of the NTLP.
Policy Framework for Regulation of Tuberculosis Medicines
Tanzania had an explicit policy aimed at controlling the 
availability of TB medicines in the country (Manual for 
Management and Control of Tuberculosis and Leprosy 
Drugs and Supplies., National TB and Leprosy Programme, 
Government of Tanzania, 2000). The main elements of the 
policy were that: 
• Importation of  TB medicines into the country is 
restricted to the Ministry of Health (MoH), through the 
MSD;
• Only health facilities affiliated with the NTLP are allowed 
to treat patients for any form of TB.
The original written notice putting the policy into effect was 
a circular from the MoHSW, and the impetus for this policy 
was reportedly carried forward and sustained to the present 
day, with the support of several political actors. The policy 
of sole procurement of TB medicines by the government was 
supported by almost all respondents representing different 
constituencies, including private stakeholders (Interviews, 
NTP officials, WHO officials, official of association of 
private health facilities). The inception of private for-
profit importation and supply of TB medicines could cause 
“undesirable influences to impinge on the government supply 
chain,” suggested an official of an association of private health 
facilities, in defence of the government-only policy. 
Regulatory Authority and Capacity
Government procedure required that the MSD procure TB 
drugs/medicines from a WHO-accredited supplier through 
international competitive tender. The Tanzanian Food and 
Drug Authority (TFDA) was responsible for screening any 
requests for importation of drugs from local distributors. The 
TFDA was also responsible for evaluating and registering 
all pharmaceutical products before they were approved for 
distribution in the country, for setting norms for prescription 
drugs, and for licencing pharmacies (Interviews, WHO 
official, NTP official). Drug control officials reported how the 
status of their own organization had grown rapidly in the past 
few years, as a result of strong political will to build regulatory 
capacity. The country has a growing pharmaceutical 
manufacturing sector, but at the time of the study, it was 
reported that there was no or little private manufacture of TB 
medicines (Interviews, drug control official, medical stores 
official, owner of private drug distribution company). 
The MSD was responsible for the storage and distribution of 
TB medicines. The NTLP dispensed medicines through the 
network of government facilities, and also undertakes some 
partnerships with private providers. In these partnerships, 
drugs and equipment were provided to private hospitals by 
the NTLP in exchange for the promise of adherence by the 
private providers to NTLP guidelines for treatment, case 
finding, diagnosis, case holding and reporting (Interviews, 
NTP officials). However, there was no report of a written 
agreement binding private facilities to adherence to NTLP 
norms. 
While professional regulatory councils such as the Medical 
Council and the Pharmacy Council are notionally responsible 
for the conduct of physicians and pharmacists, respectively, 
most respondents did not perceive that they had a major role 
in the implementation of this particular policy (Interviews, 
NTP official, WHO official, drug control official).
Implementation
The effectiveness of a written policy on restricted importation 
of TB medicines, backed by strong political commitment 
was remarked upon by more than one respondent. The 
policy was widely reported to be faithfully implemented. 
Most respondents reported that the supply and distribution 
chain for TB medicines in the public sector was efficiently 
administered by the MSD, and that there were few concerns 
apart from occasional interruptions in the stock (Interviews, 
NTP official, owner of private drug distribution company). 
Private partners of the NTLP were widely reported to 
be adherent to NTLP guidelines. TFDA conduct regular 
supervision and monitoring visits to pharmacies. Occasional 
infringements with regard to the availability of TB drugs 
in non-affiliated outlets were noted. Officials admitted 
significant challenges around the abuse of prescription drugs 
was common at the point of dispensation, and further, they 
were unable to cite instances of indictments for the abuse 
of TB medicines (Interviews, drug control official, WHO 
official, NTP official). 
Efficiency, Transparency, and Accountability
The image of a well-functioning NTP with a competent 
human resource network and a steady supply of medicines 
was emphasized by a number of respondents. The knowledge 
of readily available free treatment in government facilities 
may have contributed to a relative lack of interest by private 
providers to engage more actively with TB treatment on 
a for-profit basis. A number of respondents also reported 
how the strongly vertical nature of administrative decision-
making and enactment in the TB control programme was 
a factor in favour of the success of such policies, enabling 
focused messages and a controlled plan of execution. This 
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view was also supported by private stakeholders interviewed 
(Interviews, official of association of health facilities, WHO 
official, NTP official, owners of private drug distribution 
companies).
Private stakeholders were, however, critical of the exclusive 
nature of NTLP policy deliberations and for seldom involving 
them in discussions on clinical guidelines, or around 
policies relating to private sector regulation and partnership 
(Interviews, managers of private hospitals partnering with 
NTP, official of association of health facilities). An official 
of an association of private health facilities warned that 
private facilities were becoming increasingly cognizant of 
their financial interests and were organizing to protect these 
interests.
The other significant challenge to the convention of a 
vertically controlled programme came from within the 
government. According to WHO officials, there had recently 
been significant efforts on the part of MoHSW to integrate 
the functioning of vertical programmes, including the 
creation of centralised drug procurement systems. However, 
independent mandates and funds available to particular 
programmes such as TB and HIV tended to be an obstacle in 
complete integration, they said.
Officials also admitted to limited knowledge about the 
growing, poorly understood informal healthcare markets 
constituted by drug shops, peddlers and solo clinics – these 
markets which cater to large, less affluent populations, 
were believed to be largely out of the reach of government 
regulators (Interviews, drug control official, NTP official). 
Zambia
Background
The NTLP, an arm of the MoH, was officially charged 
with prevention and care of TB in the country, including 
dispensation of medicines through their network of health 
facilities. 
The scale and distribution of the private for-profit medical 
sector in Zambia was not well-known. Until 1991, healthcare 
provision was primarily the domain of the public sector. 
Subsequently policies of economic liberalization permitted 
the growth of the private medical sector. According to one 
respondent, an official of the Zambian Medical Association, 
a majority of Zambian doctors (75%) still practiced in the 
public health sector. Several large private corporations were 
reported to have their own hospitals. According to different 
respondents, there were approximately 400 private clinics 
in Lusaka province, the majority of which provided only 
outpatient services. There was also recognition of a growing 
role of the non-profit private sector in healthcare in Zambia.
At the time of the study, the MoH was procuring first-line 
fixed-dose TB medicines from the GDF of the WHO, and 
also to a lesser extent, independently from representatives 
of international pharmaceutical companies. All drugs 
entering the country were required to pass scrutiny by 
the Pharmaceutical Regulatory Agency (PRA). The MoH 
contracted the services of a private company to administer 
the central medical storage unit. 
Estimates of requirements of TB medicines were made 
quarterly, based on reports submitted by the NTLP in 
conjunction with the Pharmaceutical Services Division of the 
MoH, and the medicines were procured. Provincial facilities 
collected their allocations from the medical stores, and the 
medicines were distributed to district and primary health 
facilities. At government health facilities and NTP-affiliated 
private clinics, all TB medicines under the DOTS regimen 
were required to be prescribed and dispensed free, in keeping 
with the guidelines of the NTLP.
Policy Framework for Regulation of Tuberculosis Medicines
At the time of conducting the study, Zambia did not have 
an explicit written policy specifically for controlling the 
importation, distribution and dispensation of TB drugs. 
However, deliberations were underway to formalize a policy 
requirement restricting the use of all anti-TB medicines 
to facilities run by and associated with the NTLP only. 
Regardless, officials of the MoH and the NTLP highlighted 
the government’s commitment to restrict and control TB drug 
availability, actualized mainly by measures to ensure imports 
of quality drugs and control dispensing, in partnership with 
the PRA. TB medicines are required to be dispensed only on 
prescription by qualified medical practitioners (Interviews, 
NTP officials, WHO officials).
Regulatory Authority and Capacity
The steps in regulating importation of medicines included 
registration, notification, and physical inspection of stocks, by 
the PRA. In the public sector too, which imports a majority 
of TB drugs, similar regulatory procedures were followed. 
The MoH procured first-line fixed-dose TB medicines from 
international donors and pharmaceutical companies. All 
drugs entering the country were required to pass scrutiny 
by the PRA. The MoH contracted the services of a private 
company to administer the central medical storage unit, 
also known as Medical Stores Limited (MSL). The NTLP 
authorised the prescription and dispensing of TB medicines 
free at government health facilities and NTP-affiliated private 
clinics. The mandate of the PRA included regulation of drug 
manufacture, importation and retail, as well as the licensing 
and registration of establishments (Interviews, drug control 
official, NTP official, medical stores official). 
The NTLP dispensed medicines through the network of 
government facilities, and also undertook some partnerships 
with private providers In these partnerships, drugs and 
equipment were provided to private hospitals by the NTLP, 
in exchange for the promise of adherence by the private 
providers to NTLP guidelines for treatment, case finding, 
diagnosis, case holding and reporting. At the time of the 
study, these partnerships were based on informal agreements 
(Interview, health ministry official). 
A key government partner in TB care is the Churches Health 
Association of Zambia (CHAZ), who have an extensive 
network of clinics across rural Zambia and receive funds 
from the government (among other sources) for providing 
healthcare services, including for TB. CHAZ facilities 
received government medicines, reported to the public health 
system, prescribed and dispensed TB medicines according to 
national guidelines and were supervised in precisely the same 
way as government units. Furthermore, there was a formal 
memorandum of understanding guiding their relationship 
with the NTLP (Interviews, NTP official, CHAZ official).
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Drug control officials expressed grave concerns over 
financial and personnel shortages limiting their scope of 
work, particularly in the area of licensing and registration 
of pharmacy establishments, as well as for regulation of the 
pharmaceutical retail sector, particularly in the context of 
concerns over poor dispensing practices in the private for-
profit sector. Officials of professional councils stated that 
they did not have a role in regulating prescribing practices 
of physicians, and that their role was restricted to oversight 
of physicians’ professional conduct. Lack of human resource 
capacity was cited by these officials as a major factor inhibiting 
their effective functioning in this area.
Implementation
While there is no ban as such on private importation of TB 
drugs, many respondents were of the view that the private 
sector’s role was limited, even negligible in this area. A 
PRA official indicated that private import of TB drugs was 
very limited, since TB medicines had limited market value, 
further offset by the availability of free TB medicines in the 
government sector, a view supported by a representative of 
a major import company. The role of donor support was 
reported to be critical in sustaining uninterrupted supplies 
of medicines in the government network of facilities. Some 
respondents indicated the risks of dependence on donor 
support in the long run, particularly in the context of rising 
costs of medicines (Interviews, NTP officials, drug control 
official). 
Many respondents agreed that the supply and distribution 
chain for TB medicines in the public sector was well-
supervised and administered with few interruptions in the 
stock. However, regulating private drug distribution was 
reported as a major challenge by PRA officials, in the context 
of a growing but poorly understood private pharmacy sector, 
including many illegal drug shops.
TB progamme managers and provincial officers asserted 
that prescribing and dispensing practices within government 
facilities and in affiliated private facilities were well-supervised 
and there were few instances of non-adherence to national 
policy guidelines. The affiliated facilities were subjected to 
supervisory visits and asked to maintain records in the same 
manner as government clinics. Private providers were also 
invited to training sessions in TB management, organized 
by the NTLP. However, several respondents remarked on 
instances of mismanagement of TB in unaffiliated private 
sector, and OTC dispensing of TB drugs in pharmacies 
(Interviews, NTP officials, drug control official).
Efficiency, Transparency, and Accountability
The role of donor support was reported to be critical in 
sustaining uninterrupted supplies of medicines. Some 
respondents indicated the risks of dependence on donor 
support in the long run, particularly in the context of rising 
costs of medicines. The success of the NTLP in ensuring 
adherence to TB guidelines was attributed to a vertically 
administered programme structure with its own exclusive 
management units at provincial- and district-levels 
(Interviews, NTP officials, drug control official). 
Most private hospitals in partnership with the NTLP were 
well-appointed institutions with relatively affluent clientele. 
Officials reported that solo private healthcare establishments 
and the informal healthcare sector that were known to 
cater to less affluent sections, was poorly understood with a 
largely undocumented set of practices. There were reported 
to be more than 500 private clinics in Lusaka province, the 
majority of which provided only outpatient services – many 
respondents were sceptical of the ability of government 
regulators to enforce dispensing and prescribing norms in 
this sector (Interviews, NTP officials, drug control official, 
medical stores official). 
Policy and health system actors’ key observations about the 
processes of regulation of TB medicines in the three study 
countries, are summarized in Table 4.
Discussion
Table 4 highlights the variations and similarities in regulatory 
processes, and of constraining and enabling factors, between 
the different countries studied. The existing literature reveals 
little about the challenges faced by governments, and the 
opportunities that present, in strengthening regulation of 
the availability and quality of TB medicines. The dearth of 
literature on regulatory processes relating to TB medicines 
in LMICs made it impossible to couch the findings of 
these studies in terms of the existing knowledge. Yet the 
juxtaposition of the differing regulatory processes and 
factors in the different countries serves to highlight several 
themes of national as well as cross-cutting relevance. A key 
limitation of this paper is that its messages derive largely from 
subjective accounts of the individual actors interviewed, and 
cannot as such be seen to represent singular objective reality 
– we attempted to address this limitation by triangulating the 
observations of study participants with the accounts of other 
participants, and with relevant policy documentation. 
The quality and availability of TB medicines are consequences 
of regulatory processes that are often hidden from public 
eye. It is important that these regulatory processes should be 
accountable, transparent, and in the public interest. To our 
knowledge, this is the first study to attempt to understand 
and help strengthen these processes in the context of LMICs. 
Salient emergent points relating to the three framework 
elements of regulation (see Figure 1) are discussed below.
Authority and Capacity
In India, severe problems of financial, human and technical 
capacity of regulatory bodies, for all regulatory “targets” 
(see Figure 2: production and procurement, stocking and 
distribution, prescribing and dispensing), were exacerbated 
by the absence of a comprehensive policy framework 
for regulation of TB medicines. Zambian and Tanzanian 
authorities too experienced similarly depleted capacities. In 
the case of Tanzania, this was offset by regulatory authorities 
feeling relatively empowered, resulting from perceptions 
of broad political support for their existence and functions, 
and by well-articulated support for a comprehensive policy 
for restricting the import, prescibing and dispensing of TB 
medicines. A notable feature common to all three countries 
was the lack of engagement of professional (medical and 
pharmacy) regulatory councils with any activity related to 
overseeing the prescribing and dispensing practices of the 
health professionals under their charge. On the positive side 
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Table 4. Key Observations About the Regulation of Quality and Availability of TB Medicinesa
India Tanzania Zambia
Regulatory framework
• No comprehensive policy framework for 
regulation of TB medicines (-)
• Manufacture and import of TB medicines not 
specifically restricted 
• Drugs and Cosmetics Act and MoHFW guidelines 
outlined measures to assure quality of procured 
medicines (+)
• Policy of MoHSW restricted 
imports to government 
operators only (++)b
• Import of TB medicines not 
specifically restricted
• PRA and MoH guidelines outlined 
measures to assure quality of 
procured medicines (+)
Production + 
procurement
• Drugs and Cosmetics Act (universal) and MoHFW 
guidelines (government sector only) outlined 
measures to assure norms and standards during 
stocking and distribution (+)
• MSD and MoHFW 
guidelines outlined 
measures to assure norms 
and standards during 
stocking and distribution (+)
• PRA and MoH guidelines outlined 
measures to assure norms and 
standards during stocking and 
distribution (+)
Stocking + 
distribution
• MoHFW mandated DOTS regimens in all 
government facilities and in government-
affiliated private facilities (+)
• National drug schedules required that TB 
medicines be dispensed only on prescription (+)
• Policy of MoHSW stated 
that only facilities affiliated 
to the NTLP were allowed 
to prescribe and dispense 
TB medicines, in accordance 
with DOTS (++)b
• MoH mandated DOTS regimens 
in all government facilities and 
in government-affiliated private 
facilities (+)
• PRA norms required that TB 
medicines be dispensed only on 
prescription by qualified medical 
practitioners (+)
Prescribing + 
dispensing
Authority and capacity
• Drug controllers faced severe human resource 
constraints (--)b
• Concerns over technical capacity of central and 
state regulatory authorities (-)
• Amendments in laws were in process to increase 
criminal penalties for defaulters (+)
• PQ requirement not universal (at time of study) 
(-)
• Policy widely supported 
across constituencies (++)b
• Political support for 
regulatory body (++)b
• Drug controllers faced financial and 
human resource constraints (-)
Production + 
procurement
• Drug controllers faced severe human resource 
constraints (--)b
• Clear lines of authority and perception of fair 
monitoring capacity in the government TB 
programme (+)
• Clear lines of authority 
and perception of fair 
monitoring capacity in the 
government TB programme 
(+)
• Clear lines of authority and 
perception of fair monitoring 
capacity in the government TB 
programme (+)
Stocking + 
distribution
• Drug controllers faced severe human resource 
constraints to controlling dispensing practices, 
had no authority over prescribing practices (-)
• Government recommendations for drug 
regimens not applicable in private sector (--)b
• Professional councils were uninvolved in matters 
of regulating practices (-)
• Clear lines of authority 
and perception of fair 
monitoring capacity in the 
government TB programme 
(+)
• Professional councils were 
uninvolved in matters of 
regulating practices (-)
• Drug controllers faced financial and 
human resource constraints (-)
• Clear lines of authority and 
perception of fair monitoring 
capacity in the government TB 
programme (+)
• Professional councils were 
uninvolved in matters of regulating 
practices (-)
Prescribing + 
dispensing
Implementation
• Some concerns over implementation of quality 
control. Few instances of penal action (-)
• Faithful implementation of 
import restrictions (++)b
• No specific observations of barriers 
or enablers 
Production + 
procurement
• Drug controllers unable to monitor private 
distribution (--)b
• Inspections and prosecutions infrequent, in 
private sector (-)
• Clear lines of authority and perception of fair 
monitoring capacity in the government TB 
programme (+)
• Clear lines of authority 
and perception of fair 
monitoring capacity in the 
government TB programme 
(+)
• Clear lines of authority and 
perception of fair monitoring 
capacity in the government TB 
programme 
• Drug controllers ability to monitor 
private distribution questionable (-)
Stocking + 
distribution
• Fair adherence to dispensing, prescribing norms 
in government facilities (+)
• Reports of widespread violation of dispensing, 
prescribing norms in private facilities (-)b
• Inspections and prosecutions of private sector 
defaulters infrequent (-)
• Fair adherence to 
dispensing, prescribing 
norms in government and 
affiliated facilities (+)
• Some reports of abuse of 
prescription-drug norm in 
private facilities (-)
• Inspections and 
prosecutions of private 
sector defaulters infrequent 
(-)
• Fair adherence to dispensing, 
prescribing norms in government 
and affiliated facilities (+)
• Several reports of abuse of 
prescription-drug norm in private 
facilities (--)b
• Inspections and prosecutions of 
private sector defaulters infrequent 
(-)
Prescribing + 
dispensing
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Efficiency, transparency, and accountability
• Perceived inefficiencies in coordinating state and 
central authorities’ roles (-) 
• Private representation and political involvement 
in regulatory affairs widely recognized (--)b
• Perceived improved 
efficiency resulting from 
hierarchical control of TB 
programme, and exclusion 
of private actors 
• Perception that efficiency 
resulting from hierarchical 
control of TB programme, 
likely to be attenuated by 
moves to integrate disease 
programmes (-)
• Perceived improved efficiency 
resulting from hierarchical control 
of TB programme
• Risk of donor dependence in drug 
procurement (-)
Production + 
procurement
• Drug controllers prioritized drug quality 
management over regulating distributors and 
practitioners (-)
• Limited information about distribution networks 
among informal/small private sector catering to 
poor (-)
• Perception that efficiency 
resulting from hierarchical 
control of TB programme, 
likely to be attenuated by 
moves to integrate disease 
programmes (-)
• Perceived improved efficiency 
resulting from hierarchical control 
of TB programme
Stocking + 
distribution
• Professional councils rejected role in regulating 
dispensing and prescribing practices (-)
• Drug controllers prioritized drug quality 
management over regulating distributors and 
practitioners (-)
• Some professional associations opposed 
government regimens (--)b
• Perceived improved 
efficiency resulting from 
hierarchical control of TB 
programme
• Private actors perceived 
lack of inclusiveness 
of policy-making by TB 
programme (-) 
• Little information about 
practices of informal/small 
private healthcare providers 
(--)b
• Perceived improved efficiency 
resulting from hierarchical control 
of TB programme
• Little information about practices of 
informal/small private healthcare 
providers (--)b
Prescribing + 
dispensing
Abbreviations: MoHFW, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare; TB, tuberculosis; NTLP, National Tuberculosis and Leprosy Programme; PQ, Prequalification; 
PRA, Pharmaceutical Regulatory Agency; MoH, Ministry of Health; DOTS, directly observed therapy short-course; MSD, Medical Stores Department.
a Constraining and enabling factors are tagged with (-) and (+) signs, respectively.
b Most frequent and salient observation.
Table 4. Continued.
was a cross-cutting perception of good monitoring capacity 
and clear lines of authority in the government TB programmes 
(particularly in the realms of stocking, distribution and 
prescribing) of each of the three countries.
Implementation
Implementation challenges abounded, albeit not uniformly 
across the different countries and for each of the regulatory 
“targets” (Figure 2). Tanzanian import restriction norms, 
it was reported, enjoyed political support and consequently 
were also faithfully implemented. In India, against the 
backdrop of a massive private pharmaceutical sector, 
regulators were severely constrained to monitor the quality of 
stocking and distribution by private operators. Cutting across 
all three coutnries, reports of fair adherence to dispensing 
and prescribing norms in government facilities could be 
contrasted with the non-application of norms – particularly 
prescribing and dispensing norms – in the private sector. There 
were several reports of widespread violation of dispensing, 
prescribing norms in private facilities in all three countries. 
In the case of India, this supports the findings of numerous 
studies on the subject,19-22 whereas in Tanzania and Zambia 
there was a relative deficit of formal information around the 
practices of private providers. In India, it further emerged 
that the problems of inappropriate prescribing and dispensing 
were inadequately addressed, since the drug controllers’ focus 
of activities was more on improving the technical quality of 
medicines, and professional councils were uninvolved in the 
regulation of day to day practices of healthcare providers. 
Efficiency, Transparency, and Accountability
Government TB programmes in all three countries were 
generally regarded, by government and private stakeholders 
alike, to be more efficient than other disease programmes 
in procuring, distributing and dispensing medicines. This 
efficiency was explained as being associated with hierarchical 
and centralized control of programme activity, and there 
were concerns that this efficiency was likely to be reduced 
by planned integration of discrete disease programmes. A 
significant proportion of TB care occured outside of the 
ambit of the government programme, and the information 
about private markets for TB medicines was inadequate, 
particularly in the Tanzanian and Zambian contexts. These 
information deficits could present concerns for future TB 
control efforts, given the contexts of emerging healthcare 
markets in those countries. In India, ground realities of a 
dominant private sector posed a complex challenge especially 
considering the sway of a strong pharmaceutical industry over 
modestly regulated private dispensers and prescribers. Private 
interests played a problematic role in many aspects of the 
regulatory process, from private lobbying around regulation 
of drug production and procurement, to the actions of private 
associations in opposing DOTS regimens. The issue of who 
regulates the behaviour of private actors in the TB market in 
India is instructive. Even as professional councils rejected a 
role in regulating dispensing and prescribing practices, drug 
controllers prioritized the technical chores of drug quality 
management, over checking the practices of distributors and 
practitioners. Confusions over the respective roles of state and 
central drug control authorities in controlling the practices 
of manufacturers created regulatory gaps and loopholes. 
The upshot of this collective ambivalence is that regulatory 
authorities in India had effectively abdicated several key 
aspects of the regulation of market practices in TB care.
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Conclusion 
Three critical factors emerge as influencing regulatory 
processes and performance across all three country case 
studies – the presence or lack of political and stakeholder 
support for regulation, inadequate technical and human 
resource capacity of public regulatory bodies and the nature 
of private influence on regulatory policy and implementation. 
These observations have significance for other LMICs.
Political support for regulation of TB medicines is crucial. 
Tanzanian and Zambian successes in regulating TB medicines 
are underscored by a written policy (in the case of Tanzania), 
widespread acceptance of the policy and support of political 
figures for regulatory organizations. In India conversely, 
regulation of TB medicines emerges as a besieged arena, 
with a fragmented policy and widespread contestation of 
regulatory policies by private interests. Notwithstanding 
the institutional support enjoyed by regulatory bodies in 
Tanzania and Zambia, respondents in all three countries 
reported significant inadequacies in the technical and human 
resource capacities of regulatory organizations, explained in 
part by inadequate funding. 
The nature of private influences on regulatory processes is 
variable and complex. In India, the defining context is of the 
overwhelming scale and aggressively asserted interests of the 
private sector, which hamstring the operations of regulatory 
bodies, and often undermine government efforts to regulate 
access to TB medicines. In Tanzania and Zambia, where the 
public sector dominates healthcare provision for diseases such 
as TB, many private health providers and companies spoke 
out in support of regulatory policies. Yet there were reports 
of dissatisfaction with their perceived lack of inclusion in 
government policy-making, and with restrictions placed on 
private activity, indicating their growing assertiveness and 
voice in policy matters.
Strengthening regulation to ensure the quality and availability 
of TB medicines in LMICs with emerging private markets 
clearly necessitates greater financial investment in the 
human and technical capacities of regulatory organizations. 
In addition to bolstering these tangible capacities, political 
and ethical transformations are also needed in the way that 
regulatory organizations are managed and supported to 
undertake their functions. The example of Tanzania is salutary, 
and includes a written policy underscoring the social purpose 
of regulation of TB medicines, and political endorsement 
for regulatory organizations. India would be well-served by 
similar expressions of political support for regulation of the 
quality and availability of TB medicines – the recent step of 
application of schedule H1 to TB drugs represents a critical 
advance in this direction. Finally, it is critical that regulatory 
organizations be insulated from and empowered to resist the 
influence of private vested interests, in the process of making 
and implementing regulatory policies.
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